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Getting the Measure of Measurement: Global Educational Opportunity 
1. The use and misuse of measurement 
‘Not everything that counts can be counted and not everything that can be counted counts.’ 
(Einstein, attributed by Scott & Light, 2004, p. 135)  
Too many issues, activities, procedures and standards in education are corrupted by the 
inappropriate use of numerical measurement. The spectacular achievements of mathematics 
and physics in creating order through accurate measurement of time, distance, weight, height, 
length and speed have, unsurprisingly, encouraged social scientists, psychologists and 
educators to emulate such success. Pursuit of mechanical measures of quality is pervasive, 
and has infiltrated educational institutions (as manifested for example in the prominence of 
citation indices in the evaluation of academic research and league tables in rating schools and 
universities). The appeal is not difficult to explain. Given the importance of education as a 
factor affecting individual life-choices, an objective, scientific measure of quality is 
considered to be invaluable. ‘The seductiveness of such measures is that they all turn 
measures of quality into measures of quantity, thereby allowing comparison across cases with 
a single metric’ (Scott & Light 2004, p. 119).  
The seeming availability of a univocal, objective measure is, according to Scott and Light, 
one important aspect of the problem: the measures are of questionable validity since they do 
not capture what they purportedly are concerned to measure — viz., quality. But the deeper 
concern, they note, is that democratic forms of reasoning about standards and the value of 
knowledge fall prey to technical calculation lacking in scientific validity and moral 
justification (p. 119). Even if the scientific validity of the measures could be secured 
(presumably by employing sound rules of aggregation and selecting correct metrics that 
would provide relevant information), this would not be a sufficient guarantee of reliability. 
This is because such measures ‘colonize’ behaviour (Scott & Light, 2004, p. xx), creating 
new kinds of ways for people to be. Such concerns do not show that numerical information 
has no role in a process of reasonable deliberation. But Pogge sums up the obvious caution 
well: we should be aware of ‘carefully made-up statistics that keep us comfortably ignorant 
of what we are doing’ (2010a, p. 2). We need to employ established and proposed measures 
cautiously, and remain vigilant with respect to their role in public deliberation.  
Despite these cautions, we argue that some things that count can and should be counted. By 
various measures, global poverty and associated inequality in educational opportunity is an 
injustice. In Australia, the country ranked second on the Human Development Index (HDI) in 
2012, life expectancy at birth was 82 years, while mean years of schooling enjoyed by 
Australians was 12 years. By contrast, in bottom-of-the-table Mozambique, life expectancy 
was measured at 50.7 years and mean years of schooling 1.2 years (UNESCO, 2013).  
Similar raw disparities are evident in the huge differences in educational expenditure and 
participation rates between developed and developing countries reported in the monitoring 
reports of the Education for All campaign, in association with the Millennium Development 
Goals (e.g. UNESCO, 2013/14).  
Even more compelling evidence of the power of measurement of inequality, because it brings 
out the way in which numbers can indicate significance and potential for action, is the 
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evidence that Pogge (2010a) presents about global poverty and what quite modest 
redistribution from developed to developing countries could do to relieve it:   
Although 48 percent of the world’s population, 3,085 million human beings, were 
reportedly living below [the World Bank’s $2.50 a day] poverty line in 2005…their 
collective shortfall from this line amounts to only 2 percent of global household 
income. A 2 percent shift in the distribution of global household income could wholly 
eradicate the severe poverty that currently blights the lives of nearly half the human 
population.  (Pogge, 2010a, p. 12)  
Numerical measurements like these say a lot about global inequality, in which poverty and 
education are closely interrelated. The high levels of literacy and numeracy that are essential 
to development ‘come only with free and compulsory public education’ (Okin, 2003, p. 290). 
In many situations education can contribute to increased incomes. When children’s labour is 
necessary to household income they are likely to go without education. If malnourished or ill 
and unable to afford treatment they may miss school or learn less successfully. ‘If a woman 
works a seventeen hour day, she cannot take advantage of the literacy program that might 
otherwise improve her earning power or enable her to find out about her legal rights or 
government programs or services she could qualify for’ (Okin, 2003, p. 305).  
Inequalities in educational opportunities between rich and poor countries, we have argued 
(Blind review), imply cosmopolitan duties of justice that require global redistribution of 
educational resources. In focusing now on the role of measurement in pursuit of more just 
global educational opportunities, we explore the significance of quantitative information 
when asking distributional questions. Numbers are clearly important in handling such 
questions, for justice is largely about distribution (Blind review). So numerical information is 
apt, if not indispensable. And numerical indices allow for it to be presented in a form that is 
amenable to policy and decision-making in large-scale contexts.  
Yet in view of widespread recognition that numerical measures have been misused in the 
service of promoting questionable objectives in education, how can a case be made for their 
legitimate use in normative, and especially moral, analysis?  Our discussion begins (section 
2) with an illustration of the way in which metrics have featured in the formulation of 
theories of justice in political philosophy. Specifically, we examine the ways in which Rawls 
and Sen conceptualize the metric of social justice, survey more applied accounts of their 
theories, and proceed to analyses of what Pogge calls ‘morally plausible’ indices of equity. 
Arguing for a widened notion of counting, we then explore (section 3) three means of 
addressing global inequality. We defend a reconstruction of the public sphere in which 
objective measures of justice, deliberatively constructed, could supersede prevalent 
assumptions about measurement (section 4). In defending measurement, understood both 
qualitatively and quantitatively, normatively and numerically, as having an important role in 
deliberations about justice in education, we suggest that debates about the appropriate metric 
of justice are, crucially, about the normative foundations of justice.  
 
2. Justice: which metric? 
Some preliminaries 
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The justifiability of distributional principles depends in part on the rules of aggregation they 
employ, as brought out in discussions (e.g. Parfit, 2013; Scanlon, 1998) about the 
justifiability or otherwise of additive aggregative principles of reasoning, most prominently 
employed in utilitarian thought, which attempts to measure the goodness of states of affairs 
by summing benefits and harms across individual lives and discounting distributional 
considerations.  Utilitarianism often functions as the paradigmatic way of giving numerical 
considerations significance in practical reasoning. But its prominence is also responsible for 
the prevalent assumption that allowing numbers to count in normative deliberation is 
inevitably accompanied by a non-distributional view of the goodness of states of affairs. 
However, as several philosophers insist, these should be taken to be independent 
considerations.1  
The important point here is that indices, used ‘as proxies for values that political actors of 
various kinds purport to measure’ (Pogge, 2010a, pp. 76-77), required in order to evaluate 
and compare states of affairs, need to be constructed so that they reflect, isolate and point to, 
and amalgamate  morally relevant factors. As such, indices are inescapably normative. In 
political philosophy, indices are readily associated with the work of such prominent figures as 
Rawls, Sen and Pogge. In Rawls’s succinct formulation (1982, p. 364), the index of primary 
goods ‘defines a public basis of interpersonal comparisons for questions of social justice.’ Of 
course, as he himself points out (1982, p. 373), evaluations making use of indices are 
variable. ‘…we make interpersonal comparisons in many different contexts and for many 
different purposes; each context has its relevant considerations according to the appropriate 
ends in view. On birthdays we give things that we know are wanted, or that will please, to 
express affection…’ Citizens (conceived as free and equal moral persons) require primary 
goods, and justice requires distribution according to those needs (Rawls, 1982, p. 374). Since 
we are centrally concerned with principles of distribution, we are concerned with those 
theories which primarily evaluate states of affairs with respect to just distribution.  
Our central question is thus, ‘What is the proper metric of justice?’  In other words, ‘What 
should we look at when evaluating whether one state of affairs is more or less just than 
another?’ (Brighouse & Robeyns, 2010, p. 1).   
Resources or Capabilities 
Theories of justice, which have set out to provide independent, cross-cultural measures of the  
goods required for well-being, are an obvious source of candidates for the proper metric of 
justice. The most well-known and influential of all, Rawls’s (1971) account of just 
distribution, explicitly includes an index of primary goods (basic liberties, powers and 
prerogatives of offices of responsibility, income and wealth, social basis of self-respect), or 
resources, those goods which anyone would need, whatever else they wanted, the all-purpose 
means to a wide variety of ends, and the principles according to which these are to be 
distributed.  Such an index, Rawls believes, allows us to make interpersonal comparisons 
with respect to social justice (1982, p. 359). Rawls’s hypothetical contractors in the original 
position, behind a thick veil of ignorance, are given the task of choosing, in the form of 
principles of justice, fair terms of cooperation. The index of primary social goods serves, for 
them, as a ‘thin theory of the good’, which they use to measure their life-long prospects, how 
well off they would be, regardless of who they turn out to be when the veil is lifted. The use 
of primary goods in making interpersonal comparisons in questions of social justice rests on 
the conception of moral persons (Rawls, 1982). Parties ‘...best represent citizens as free and 
equal moral persons by deciding between alternative principles of justice according to how 
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securely these principles provide for all citizens the primary goods’ (Rawls, 1982, p. 366). 
Justice requires distribution according to citizens’ needs as free and equal moral persons who 
try to realize their conceptions of the good. The principles of justice are rules that determine 
how these goods are to be distributed.  
 
Anderson (2010) helpfully breaks down the two main constituents of theories of distributive 
justice: they must, she insists, specify two things: a metric, which characterizes the type of 
good subject to demands of justice, and a rule that determines how the good should be 
distributed. Different theories of justice may thus be compared with respect to these: 
utilitarianism proposes a subjective metric (happiness, preference satisfaction) as opposed to 
both Rawlsians and capability theorists who propose objective metrics (resources and 
functionings respectively). Deliberations about social justice can never dispense with 
qualitative reasoning; counting can never be a proxy for this, although it can be a very useful 
aid to reflective evaluation (Anderson, 2010). Questions about the metric of social justice 
attempt to find out what the appropriate informational basis of evaluations should be taken to 
be. Sen (2009, p. 291) reminds us that ‘Every normative theory of social justice demands 
equality of something — liberty, income, equal treatment of everyone’s rights’.  It proposes 
an informational focus or metric: utilitarianism concentrates on individual happiness, 
pleasure, or ‘utility’ as the best way of assessing individual well-being, Sen (2009) takes 
capability as a basic informational ingredient, and Rawls believes social primary goods 
provide the informational basis for evaluations concerning just distribution. Ultimately, the 
plausibility of the metric is intrinsically tied to the theory of justice from which it derives. 
Theories of justice also provide rules about how the goods specified by the metric are to be 
distributed to meet requirements of justice. Rawlsians and capability theorists propose 
procedural and distribution-sensitive rules, while utilitarians insist on rules that sum and 
maximize the good — and are pattern-insensitive. 
Rawls’s theory provides for assessment of outcomes that is much more complex than the 
simple additive aggregation of utilitarianism. Fairness is a function not simply of the 
maximization of happiness or desire satisfaction, but, crucially, of their distribution, and 
goods are defined with respect to what citizens require in order to realize their nature as 
moral persons. 
The now standard alternative to Rawls’s metric is provided by the ‘capabilities approach’ of 
Sen and Nussbaum, who propose that the ‘currency of justice’ is fundamental human 
capabilities or functionings, rather than social primary goods. The latter, they believe, in 
failing to track the diverse ways in which people are able to use goods to achieve their ends, 
stops short of ensuring well-being and the opportunity to realize positive freedom 
(Nussbaum, 2007; Sen, 2009).  This is because people have varying needs for resources and 
different abilities to convert resources into functioning. The value of resources lies in how 
they promote human functioning: the focus in evaluating just distribution is on the personal 
characteristics (capabilities or substantive freedoms) that govern conversion of primary goods 
into a person’s ability to promote her ends, rather than on a standard set of resources at her 
disposal. Sen has argued that the primary goods metric is too inflexible to take account of the 
diversity of needs, varying with health, longevity, location. Thus, for Sen, the Rawlsian 
metric, which focuses on means rather than on actual opportunities of living, fails to capture 
the differential advantages enjoyed by people with different capacities to convert primary 
goods into functionings, and so allows for ‘unjustified inequality’ (Sen, 1990, p. 112). For 
both Nussbaum and Sen the ‘space’ of justice is that of capabilities, rather than opportunities.   
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We shall not attempt to adjudicate the dispute about the reducibility or otherwise of one of 
these positions to the other, but we do take them to be notational variants, differing in 
emphasis or on minor details.2  Both are illuminating when applied to justice in education. 
Education viewed in Rawlsian terms as a social primary good is also likely to lead to the 
acquisition of other primary goods like employment and income. A resourcist approach is 
amenable to measurement of opportunity, in the form of expenditure, school attendance, 
provision of classrooms, learning materials and qualified teachers. The capability approach in 
turn exposes some limitations of a resourcist view of educational opportunity by showing 
how persons are differently placed to benefit from educational opportunities, by varying 
personal attributes and circumstances that may favour or impair their converting 
opportunities into outcomes. The capability approach demonstrates that outcomes in the form 
of capabilities and functionings, which are less amenable to numerical measurement, are also 
a crucial facet of equal opportunity. But learning outcomes can be especially vulnerable to 
educationally inappropriate forms of measurement that colonize and corrupt what they are 
supposed to promote. And some intrinsically valuable benefits of educational opportunities, 
whether formal, non-formal or informal, are not measurable by any index.  
Objectivity and Metrics  
Sen asks: ‘In what way can diagnosis of injustice or identification of what would reduce or 
eliminate it be objective?’ Demands of objectivity call for objective reasoning in thinking 
about issues of justice and injustice (Sen, 2009, p. 41), and in turn to public reasoning (2009, 
p. 122). Sen recognizes the importance of Rawls’s work (e.g. 1971) in drawing attention to 
the point that judgements of justice can’t be an entirely private affair, and that a ‘public 
framework of thought’ is critically important. Both Rawlsian and capability theories of 
justice are committed to objective notions of the good in matters of just distribution. This is a 
major difference between them and utilitarian accounts of justice. They both hold that the 
standard of objectivity of ethical principles is ‘basically congruent with their defensibility 
within a public framework of thought’ (Sen, 2009, p.134).  But several commentators (e.g. 
Pogge, 2010b) have pointed out that Sen’s insistence on a public framework is in tension with 
the insistence on sensitivity to the variable capacity sought by capability theorists. Pogge 
(2010b) believes that capability theory does not yield an informationally workable metric, 
because it cannot function as a public criterion of social justice. Kelly (2010) concurs that 
Sen’s proposed metric does not seem to lend itself to the construction of a public common 
standard of measurement for interpersonal comparisons as readily as Rawls’s (1971) notion 
of primary goods: Rawls thus provides a much stronger basis for meeting the publicity 
requirement. Kelly finds it difficult to conceive of ‘…how a common standard of 
measurement could be constructed’ if claims of distributive justice focused on welfare or 
‘functionings’ (2010, p. 62). On the other hand, the notion of primary goods ‘…provides a 
public and readily quantifiable measure for interpersonal comparisons.’ In addition, by 
circumventing appeals to contested conceptions of the good, the metric of primary goods 
provides a basis for public decision-making. 
Morally plausible metrics 
There is a growing interest among political and policy theorists in indices, both as 
instruments for aggregating information and as standards of evaluation. But if indices are to 
capture phenomena of normative interest (e.g. poverty, gender equality) rules of aggregation 
and metrics need to be appropriate so as to base evaluations on relevant information.3  
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Sen’s landmark work, Development as Freedom (1999) is an incisive critique of many World 
Bank policies and led to changes in how the UN measures development (in various Human 
Development Reports from 1990 onwards). For Sen, meaningful development can’t be 
equated with economic growth ‘…or measured in the readily calculable ways preferred by 
most economists, but must take account of how people are capable of functioning…’ (Okin, 
2003, p. 289). Development is gauged instead with respect to the expansion of people’s 
freedoms. 
Due to the work of Sen and his colleagues, the capability approach has been operationalized 
by UN and various national governments and adopted by many policymakers and 
economists. The capability approach has enjoyed much attention and influence, having 
captured the attention of international agencies and nongovernmental organizations, largely 
as a result of the fact that the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has adopted 
scores on the Human Development Index (HDI), which is a capability metric worked out in 
collaboration with Sen, rather than GNP per capita as its official comparative measure.  
More generally, development economists are now rethinking goals and measurement of 
economic development. Okin points to work that registers the neglect of ‘…well-being, 
freedom, capacities, functioning and voices of the world’s women, especially the poorest’ 
(Okin 2003, p. 288).   The ‘feminization of global poverty’, Okin claims, has not been well 
served by standard economic measures that take the family as their basic economic unit and 
do not disaggregate data with respect to individual members. Treating each household as a 
‘black box’, these measures have failed to detect the extent of gender inequality, since they 
are insensitive to intrafamily distributions. In addition, economic productivity is measured in 
terms of labour, goods, services bought and sold in the marketplace, and excludes 
measurement of reproductive labour.  
The HDI allows for quality of life comparisons across nations to be made in a way that 
captures data about individual rather than aggregate well-being. Annual Human Development 
Reports use concepts of functionings and capabilities as one of their theoretical cornerstones 
(UNDP). More than 500 regional Human Development Reports have been published. In 
Britain work done for the Equality and Human Rights Commission builds on and extends the 
capability approach (e.g. Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2011). 
Some critics like Pogge (2010a), however, believe that the UN’s HDI, though apparently 
more comprehensive and multidimensional (degree of development of each nation is 
calculated as the average of three components: life expectancy at birth (L), education (E), and 
gross domestic product (GNP) per capita (P)), is still defective insofar as it is a measure that 
applies to countries rather than individuals. It fails to capture information about distribution 
within populations.  It does not capture the extent and depth of human deprivation. Of most 
concern is that flawed indices misdirect policy makers (Pogge, 2010a). Pogge’s positive 
suggestion is that, in order to do better in constructing indices, interpersonal aggregation 
should be performed only after the relevant aspects of each person’s situation have been 
holistically assessed.  The idea is that a holistic measure of individual deprivation, grounded 
in a sound conception of basic human needs/requirements/capabilities, can be used in a range 
of different aggregation exercises without swamping information concerning individuals and 
their circumstances. 
Recent Human Development Reports have responded to criticisms of early constructions of 
the HDI, changing the factors taken into account, the weighting of factors, and how they 
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relate to one another. The HDI also acknowledges the need for measurement of poverty 
within developed states: the 2013 Human Development Report observes (p. 2), that ‘[t]here is 
a south in the north and a north in the south’.  
 3. Making what counts count 
What counts, who counts? 
Despite Einstein’s warning (Scott & Light, 2004, p. 135) against the assumption that all 
things that count can be counted and conversely that all things that can be counted count, the 
evidence of recent debates about metrics of justice suggests to us that some important things 
that count can be counted and that if informed by proper philosophical reflection the counting 
is getting better.  Perhaps ‘we are at least working in the right place and looking at the right 
thing’, as Nussbaum observes of the Human Development Reports (Nussbaum, 2002, p. 135).  
As indices improve and debates about their merits embrace wider publics, so we could reduce 
the chances of  colonizing the very goods and outcomes that we set out to measure, in 
addressing both global poverty and the unequal educational opportunity that it reflects and 
reproduces.  
The Education for All Global Monitoring Reports present evidence of both the dangers of 
colonization and of refinement of indices used to measure inequality and progress in 
alleviating it. Although the number of children not in school fell by almost half from 107 
million to 57 million between 1999 and 2011 (UNESCO 2013/4), states’ pursuit of enrolment 
targets has been at the expense of quality education, for the basics have not been learned by 
an estimated 250 million children (UNESCO, 2013/4). Looking ahead to the post-2015 
framework, the 2013/4 Global Monitoring Report implicitly responds to the colonization 
effect generated by targeting bigger numbers of children in schools, observing that the 
emphasis has as a result shifted from increasing enrolments to regarding quality education as 
central. While enrolments have improved, pupil-teacher ratios have barely changed. Raw 
enrolment measures will need to be read alongside progression rates, data on completion of 
primary school, and assessments of learning. Children in countries that do not yet produce 
these kinds of measures are not counted, nor are children not in school in countries that do 
produce data on assessments of learning taking place in schools. Much more work needs to 
be done to disaggregate the data, e.g., to ‘distinguish clearly between children from 
advantaged and disadvantaged households’ (UNESCO, 2013/4, p. 91).   
Whatever progress has been achieved so far, the Millennium Development Goal of universal 
primary education as ‘Education for All’ will not be achieved. As noted earlier, in comparing 
measures of poverty and access to schooling in Australia and Mozambique, vastly unequal 
resources and opportunities indicate that global redistribution is needed. Redistribution of 
resources would create enhanced opportunities to develop literacy, numeracy, information, 
skills and the critical perspectives individuals and societies need to exercise their will through 
their participation in global public reason, as well as in viable economies, on equal terms with 
others. Such public reason, if it includes debates about global justice, its metrics and 
measures, will require a numerate and literate global population. 
Further progress towards better measures, in the sense of both indices and associated policies, 
demands a widened notion of counting. As well as being critically vigilant about counting 
what can both be counted and is worth counting, who counts, how do they count, and under 
what conditions is the counting done? We bear these underlying questions in mind in now 
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discussing what measures ought to be taken to create a global order that measures up 
normatively, considering three means of addressing inequalities in the global distribution of 
resources: redistribution through individual and institutional action; structural changes in the 
global order; and counting the voices of the poor.  
Redistribution 
Global inequality is huge and growing, both between countries (Pogge, 2010a) and between 
rich and poor within countries (Piketty, 2013).  Possible remedies to global inequalities 
between countries have been proposed by both resourcists and capability theorists, as well as 
by utilitarians (e.g. Singer, 2009). One such remedy is explicitly distributive, for example 
Pogge’s (2010a) claim that the poverty gap could be erased if global household income were 
redistributed by a shift of  2 percent). Varying measures have been proposed to effect such a 
shift.  Recommending that rich nations agree to allocate 1 percent of their GDP to address 
this gap, Nussbaum (2004, p. 16) argues that ‘Prosperous nations have responsibility to give 
a substantial portion of their GDP to poorer nations’ (emphasis in original), as they have 
responsibilities to develop the capabilities of citizens of poorer countries as well as their own. 
Young (2011) supported the view that absolute poverty in the world could be eliminated if 
only the richest nations were to devote 0.7 percent of GNP to and for the world’s poor. 
Redistribution of wealth from rich to poor countries could take the form of voluntary 
contributions by individuals (Singer, 2009).  Voluntary philanthropy on the part of those who 
can afford to give does pose some practical problems, such as which charitable organisations 
can be trusted to direct donations to those most in need and for projects that do improve the 
conditions of the world’s poorest people. A well rehearsed philosophical problem is how we 
might ensure that all who could contribute will do so; why would some who can afford to 
contribute do so if others similarly placed decline to do so? Global poverty is a structural 
problem that demands structural solutions, not one that can be adequately addressed through 
individual action. 
Structural change 
In his account of the kinds of institutional reforms that would count, Pogge is skeptical about 
the role of individual action through such measures as affluent citizens’ donations.  Because 
the international rules that govern national and international economic transactions ‘are the 
most important causal determinants of the extent and depth of severe poverty and other 
human rights deficits’ (2010a, p. 52),  global structural reform rather than ‘aid’ is his 
preferred option. It would also cost affluent citizens less and would be more likely to be 
supported than donations. This kind of agency requires at least that global citizens in rich 
countries exercise institutional negative duties, because ‘citizens may be implicated when 
social institutions they uphold foreseeably produce an unavoidable human rights deficit on a 
regular basis’ (2010a, p. 29). Such deficits, Pogge argues, can be attributed to institutional 
factors. These include both the actions of global institutions and institutional arrangements in 
developing countries, controlled by economic and political elites for their own gain, 
frequently with the connivance of multinational companies, and agencies and governments of 
developed countries, e.g. through bribery and resource privilege (2010a, p. 47f).  Structural 
reforms, ‘Even small changes in the rules governing transnational trade, lending, investment, 
resource use, or intellectual property can have a huge impact on the global incidence of life-
threatening poverty.’ (p. 53; see also p. 55) 
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Nussbaum (2004) believes that we all share a collective duty to address the entitlement of all 
human beings to the development of the capabilities4 she lists. But she too regards creating 
appropriate institutional structures as more suitable than looking to individual efforts (2004, 
pp. 14-15) — including among these structures domestic organizations, multinational 
corporations, agencies like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, the UN, the 
World Court, as well as NGOs, in a ‘thin, decentralized, yet forceful global public sphere’ 
(2004, p. 16, emphasis in original). Such a global public sphere should enable the voices of 
the poor to be heard and to count. 
Taking the voices of the poor into account 
The global poor count not only as deserving of remedial action by rich countries’ individual 
citizens, as well as by governments and NGOs, and also corporations and global bodies that 
have tended to serve the interests of the developed north. A strong case has been made by 
both philosophers and the authors of the Human Development Reports that the voices of the 
poor must count in public debate about remedial change to address their needs.  
Okin’s account of evidence about ‘what the people who comprise the least well-off quintile 
think about their own most pressing needs’ (2003, p. 280) supports the view that listening to  
their voices is indispensable to addressing global injustice. Policy and practice in economic 
development have excluded the perspectives of the poor, especially those of women. The 
1990 Human Development Report identified the need to hear women’s voices early in the 
development of the Human Development Index, remarking (UNDP, 1990, p. 32): ‘Women 
count – but are not counted’.  Okin insists too that GDP does not measure development and 
that measured growth does not measure poverty reduction. Significantly for our purposes, she 
notes how frequently studies that do listen to the voices of the poor, especially those of 
women, report their wish for educational opportunities, for themselves and for their children. 
Nussbaum (2002, p. 135) presses support for listening to the voices of the poor further, in the 
direction of democratizing measurement itself: ‘We need to rely on the ingenuity of those 
who suffer from deprivation: they will help us find ways to describe, and even to quantify, 
their predicament’. 
Voice continues to feature strongly in recent Human Development Reports. The 2013 Report 
emphasises the importance of enabling citizens, including the youth, to participate by giving 
voice to their views and needs  (UNDP, 2013). Unjust governance systems compound unjust 
and inequitable socio-economic conditions because they are monopolised by the wealthy and 
the powerful, excluding the voiceless (p. 37). The Human Development Reports often note 
the link between education and political empowerment: ‘Trends conducive to empowerment 
include the vast increases in literacy and educational attainment in many parts of the world 
that have strengthened people’s ability to make informed choices and hold governments 
accountable’ (UNDP, 2010, p. 6). 
4. For good measure: disaggregating global political structures 
To complement our discussion, in section 2, of problems of aggregation in indices of poverty 
and inequality, we conclude by proposing a different form of disaggregation, of states as 
political units in which objectivity may be sought when public reason addresses inequalities 
and distribution of resources. For Pogge (2010a) the traditional distinction between 
international and intra-national relations is obsolete; hence he prefers the term ‘global’ to 
‘international’ (p. 14).  Charles Beitz’s earlier groundbreaking extension of Rawls’ (1971) 
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principles of justice to the global sphere points the way (Beitz, 1999, p. 199): choices, 
whether about institutions or policies, should consider impartially the claims of every person 
who could be affected.    
Far from following this maxim, the world actually operates through institutions, from global 
to local, that ‘apply to people largely without their consent and which have the capacity to 
influence fundamentally the course of their lives’ (Beitz, 1999, p. 204). The integrated global 
economy makes it increasingly difficult to distinguish global institutional structures from 
domestic structures. This interdependence led Beitz to influentially extend the theory of 
justice that Rawls intended for one society to a theory of global distributive justice, applying 
the difference principle both to the minimization of intrastate inequalities and ‘to persons in 
the sense that it is the globally least advantaged representative person (or group of persons) 
whose position is to be maximized’ (p. 152). 
Switching the emphasis of justice, distribution, and so of politics itself from the entrenched 
idea of the world as comprising distinct societies constituted as states has radical implications 
not only for how people, poverty  and unequal educational opportunities are counted. 
Nussbaum, Sen and Pogge, and Beitz (inter alia) envisage obligations of justice in a global 
politics extending beyond nation states. In this crucial respect they depart from Rawls (1971).  
They would all agree with Nussbaum’s objection to Rawls that his statist position ‘…cannot 
defend redistribution from richer to poorer nations’ (2004, p. 4). They would also insist that 
public reason is central to democracy and justice both domestically and globally.  
Just as improved indices have required disaggregation of factors that previously seemed 
obviously aggregable, so too some disaggregation and reconstruction of organisations and 
publics responsible for counting will be needed. While much work remains to be done on 
feasible conceptions and structures for global democracy, several options have been put 
forward. Although there is widespread scepticism about the feasibility of creating formal 
global structures of governance (see for example Goodin, 2009), Held’s (1995) theory of 
cosmopolitan democracy has, for example, proposed an elected assembly as an additional 
United Nations structure. Others (e.g. Cohen & Sabel, 2004; Bohman, 2007) have turned to 
the European Union as an emergent political order whose web of procedures, such as the 
Open Method of Coordination, enable citizens to debate EU policies across national 
boundaries with other EU citizens.  Bohman has also explored the potential of public sphere 
theory for developing global democracy through forms of distributed communication across 
multiple demoi (2009). Much further disaggregation and reconstruction will need to take 
place, of publics and organisations that could enable the global order and particular 
democratic regimes measure up to the demands of justice. Whatever forms such spaces and 
structures ultimately take, achieving objective measures of justice, in education and 
elsewhere, is best understood as predominantly a normative, political matter, rather than a 
question of perfecting numerical indices. 
  
Notes 
1. In line with our own views in this paper, Parfit (2013) for example has recently been 
at pains to show that by allowing numbers to count, we are not necessarily committed 
to discounting distributional considerations. The reason utilitarianism is deficient, he 
claims, is not because it gives weight to numbers, but because it ignores distributive 
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considerations. A position which is duly sensitive to the latter, is not necessarily 
precluded from taking numbers into account, or arriving at conclusions by 
aggregating different factors. Aggregation need not take the form of simple summing 
(see also Temkin, 2009, p. 3). The elements relative to goodness of lives or outcomes 
can be combined non-additively as well (as in principles that accommodate 
distributive considerations, like maximin, that privileges the welfare levels of the 
worst off, adopting the alternative whose worst outcome is superior to the worst 
outcome of any other alternative (Rawls, 1971)).   
2.      See Anderson (2010), where is becomes clear in her attempt to compare resourcist 
and capability views that they are aligned with respect to most of the central questions 
making up their respective theories. Pogge (2010b) more directly asserts that the list 
of key determinants of quality of life that Sen (2010) lists can be represented in 
resourcist theories—both, Pogge claims, share a commitment to normative 
individualism, to the individual as the ultimate reference point for evaluating 
institutional orders, and so to the same aggregative function, and are similarly 
opposed to sum-ranking aggregation of utilitarianism. More concretely, both 
capability and resourcist theories of justice disaggregate data, and so can evaluate 
intrafamily distributions. In addition, sophisticated resourcist theories are sensitive to 
diversity of social and environmental context.) Several commentators (e.g. Daniels, 
2010) go further, arguing that the distinction between capabilities and opportunities is 
not clearly sustainable.  The most significant difference that Daniels and Anderson 
independently identify is that capability theory insists on a more demanding 
opportunity principle, one which is sensitive to more aspects of disadvantage than 
Rawls’s principle. 
3.      The World Bank provides, in Pogge’s view clear examples of how not to use indices. 
For example, in recording information on household consumption it ignores 
household composition. He also objects to its practice of adjusting the international 
poverty line (IPL), by changing the base year for comparing the purchasing power of 
currencies, switching from talk of ‘number’ to ‘proportion’ in addressing the objective 
of halving poverty by 2015, because it patently misrepresents progress towards 
attaining the UN Millennium Development Goals (2010a, p. 58). Warning against 
apparent achievement of progress through statistical gimmicks, Pogge observes that: 
‘The steady stream of happy news that World Bank delivers from the poverty front—
worked into the titles less anyone miss the point—is not robust with respect to the 
level at which the IPL is set. This discredits the method the Bank and the UN are 
using to track world poverty by counting the poor’ (2010a, p. 65). 
4.  Nussbaum (e.g. 2007) lists ten capabilities: life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, 
imagination and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; 
control over one’s environment. 
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